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PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW APPLIED
TO ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS
CONTRACTS: A MODEL FOR BALANCING
THE RIGHTS OF THE INDUSTRY WITH
PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF MINORS
John H. Shannon∗ & Richard J. Hunter, Jr.∗∗
This Article discusses the context of common law and statutory
materials dealing with minors who participate in the entertainment and
sports fields. The Article describes the changes undertaken as a result
of several notorious cases involving prominent child actors, and how
the California legislature dealt with issues ranging from set asides of
income, approval of contracts by a competent court of jurisdiction,
recognition of the legitimate interests of all parties to the contract, to
principles under which a minor would be precluded from disaffirming a
contract. The Article then applies and extends the principles developed
in entertainment contracts to minors who participate in professional
athletics and offers concrete suggestions for perfecting a balance in
interests by focusing on assuring the minor with representation by
“qualified counsel experienced with entertainment industry law and
practices.”***

∗ Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Seton Hall University.
∗∗ Professor of Legal Studies, Seton Hall University.
∗∗∗ This Article is dedicated to Janine Cinseruli who, as a pioneer for equality, in 1974 was
successful in breaking the barrier for girls playing in Little League baseball.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider this scenario. Janine has been playing basketball since
she was five years old. By the time she reached the age of thirteen,
she was already well over six feet tall, and by her fourteenth
birthday, she had grown to nearly seven feet. She exhibits the skills
required to play basketball at a very high level. She was found by
ISTAR, a movie company that specializes in made-for-TV movies
appealing to youngsters and early teens. She signed a six year
contract with ISTAR to star in a series of six movies about a young
girl who plays a variety of sports for $100,000 per film. The first
movies were very popular and Janine became an instant star. Now,
after a year or so, Janine stands over seven feet tall and she is being
actively recruited by the Philadelphia Phillies, a team in the
Women’s Professional Basketball League (WPBL), which offers her
a sixty-five million dollar, multi-year contract. Janine is now trying
to “get out from under” her ISTAR contract and sign with the
WPBL.
Some professional sports organizations have imposed “artificial
age limits” on their younger athletes; for example, players must be at
least twenty years of age in the National Football League1 and
nineteen in the National Basketball Association.2 Meanwhile, in
other sports, there are some glaring examples of younger players
(often minors) who have achieved a high level of success at an early
age:3
• Pelé—pro soccer player at 16, World Cup winner at 17;
• Freddy Adu—pro soccer player at 14;
• Wayne Gretzky—pro hockey player at 18;
• Michelle Wie—qualified for the United States Golf
Association Amateur Championship at 10;
• Alex Rodriguez—pro baseball player at 18;
• Andre Agassi—pro tennis player at 16; and
• Pete Sampras—pro tennis player at 17.

1. See Age Limits in Professional Sports. Your Thoughts?, DEMOCRATIC UNDERGROUND
(June 21, 2005, 5:28 PM), http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az
=view_all&address=215x17914.
2. See NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, NBA PLAYERS UNITED 1 (Dec. 8, 2011),
http://www.nbpa.org/cba/2011.
3. See Age Limits in Professional Sports. Your Thoughts?, supra note 1.
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With so many younger players exhibiting the skills necessary to
compete successfully at the professional level, questions are
necessarily being raised relating to the legitimacy of contracts
entered into by the minor or by or with the athlete’s parent(s) or
guardian(s).4
Federal law is designed to prohibit practices that amount to
“oppressive child labor.”5 The seminal statute is the Federal Labor
Standards Act (FLSA).6 In addition to this federal legislation, all fifty
states and the District of Columbia have adopted child labor laws.7
Pursuant to the FLSA, and with the exception of children who might
be performing “chores” on their family farms or who work in
agricultural employment,8 the Department of Labor has adopted
regulations that define both lawful and unlawful child labor:

4. Sports Contracts—Basic Principles, USLEGAL, http://sportslaw.uslegal.com/sports
-agents-and-contracts/sports-contracts-%e2%80%93-basic-principles/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
5. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(l), 207, 212 (2012); see also 29 U.S.C. § 212(c) (2000) (“No
employer shall employ any oppressive child labor in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce or in any enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce.”).
6. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2012). The relevant portion of the law states: “No producer,
manufacturer or dealer shall ship or deliver for shipment in commerce any goods produced in an
establishment situated in the United States in or about which within thirty days prior to the
removal of such goods there from any oppressive child labor has been employed.” Id. § 212(a).
This provided the constitutional basis for the statute under a Commerce Clause analysis. See
Richard J. Hunter, Jr. et al., Regulation: A Historical Perspective and Discussion of the Impact of
the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment and the Move to Deregulate the American
Economy, 32 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 137, 138 (2011).
7. See Willis J. Norlund, A Brief History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 39 LAB. L.J. 715,
721 (1988).
8. For an extensive discussion of the principles associated with minors working in
agricultural occupations, see Child Labor Requirements in Agricultural Occupations Under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (Child Labor Bulletin 102), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (rev. 2007),
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/childlabor102.pdf. The provision relating to children
involved in agricultural work states:
[T]he provisions of section 212 of this title relating to child labor shall not apply to any
employee employed in agriculture outside of school hours for the school district where
such employee is living while he is so employed, if such employee—
(A) is less than twelve years of age and (i) is employed by his parent, or by a person
standing in the place of his parent, on a farm owned or operated by such parent or
person, or (ii) is employed, with the consent of his parent or person standing in the
place of his parent, on a farm, none of the employees of which are . . . required to be
paid at the wage rate prescribed by section 206(a)(5) of this title,
(B) is twelve years or thirteen years of age and (i) such employment is with the consent
of his parent, or person standing in the place of his parent, or (ii) his parent or such
person is employed on the same farm as such employee, or
(C) is fourteen years of age or older.
29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(1) (2004).
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• Children under the age of 14 cannot work except as
newspaper deliverers;
• Children between the ages of 14 and 15 may work limited
hours in nonhazardous jobs approved by the Department of
Labor; and
• Children between the ages of 16 and 17 may work unlimited
hours in nonhazardous jobs.
Thus, the FLSA embodies the basic premise that the
employment of children under the age of sixteen is oppressive, unless
the Department of Labor determines that the job is nonhazardous.9
The FLSA also restricts the hours of minors’ employment.
Additionally, federal regulations prohibit the employment of minors
at times that would interfere with their education. However, as a
general rule, the protections that are afforded to minors are not
accorded to child performers because they have received a specific
exemption from the FLSA.10
This Article considers the broad principles applicable in the
entertainment industry and asks the question: Should these principles
be the guideposts in the area of contracts with athletes who are
minors?

9. Hazardous occupations include manufacture or storage of explosives, businesses
requiring driving or assisting on a motor vehicle, logging and sawmilling, meatpacking or
processing, excavating, roofing, demolition, mining (except coal), brick or tile manufacture, and
businesses exposing children to radioactive substances. Children may not perform jobs requiring
the operation of power-driven woodworking machines, hoisting machines, sawing or shearing
machines, and metal processing, nor in the fields of meat-processing, bakery, or paper product.
See Marie A. Fallinger, “Too Cheap Work for Anyone but Us”: Toward a Theory and Practice of
Good Child Labor, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1035, 1041 n.24 (2004) (citing U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-880, LABOR CAN STRENGTHEN ITS EFFECTS TO PROTECT
CHILDREN WHO WORK, at 5, 8 (2002)); What Jobs Can Youth Do, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.youthrules.dol.gov/jobs.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2014).
10. See Exemptions from Child Labor Rules in Non-Agriculture, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/elaws/esa/flsa/cl/exemptions.asp (last visited Aug. 4, 2014); see also Jessica
Krieg, Comment, There’s No Business Like Show Business: Child Entertainers and the Law, 6
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 429, 431 (2004) (“Minors employed as actors or performers in motion
pictures or theatrical productions, or in radio or television productions are exempt from Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) coverage. Therefore, FLSA rules regarding total allowable number
of work hours in one day and allowable times of day to work do not apply.”).
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II. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW UNDER
11
A COMMON LAW ANALYSIS
The legal issue underlying the above scenario is that of legal or
contractual capacity. Courts require that parties to an otherwise valid
contract have the requisite contractual capacity to enter into an
agreement.12 Courts, however, have determined that certain persons
lack the required capacity; among those lacking capacity are minors,
persons suffering from substantial mental incapacity, and intoxicated
persons, to name a few.13
Minors have traditionally been considered as persons who may
lack the maturity, experience, or sophistication needed to enter into
contracts with adults.14 Under the common law, minors were defined
as females under the age of eighteen and males under the age of
twenty-one.15 Under American law, individual states have enacted
statutes that define who might be considered a minor and the
requisite age of majority—the age at which a minor generally
acquires the right to enter into a valid contract. The most prevalent
age of majority is eighteen years of age for both males and females.
The age below the age of majority is referred to as the period of
minority.
In order to protect the minor who has entered into a contract
during the period of his or her minority, the legal system recognizes
11. See generally HENRY R. CHEESMAN, BUSINESS LAW ch. 12. (7th ed. 2010) (describing
the application of rules that apply in determining issues relating to legal capacity to enter into a
contract); RICHARD J. HUNTER, JR. ET AL., THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS: A
MANAGERIAL AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVE ch. 9 (3d ed. 2010) (describing the application of
rules that apply to determining issues relating to legal capacity to enter into a contract involving
minors’ contracts).
12. See generally ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY
481–501 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing the infancy doctrine).
13. See, e.g., EDWARD J. MURPHY & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW
546–69 (Lon L. Fuller et al. eds., 2d ed. 1972).
14. See Harvey v. Hadfield, 372 P.2d 985 (Utah 1962). The court noted:
Since time immemorial courts have quite generally recognized the justice and propriety
of refusing to enforce contracts against minors, except for necessities. It is fair to
assume that because of their immaturity they may lack the judgment, experience and
will power which they should have to bind themselves to what may turn out to be
burdensome and long-lasting obligations. Consequently courts are properly solicitous
of their rights and afford them protection from being taken advantage of by designing
persons, and from their own imprudent acts, by allowing them to disaffirm contracts
entered into during minority which upon more mature reflection they conclude are
undesirable.
Id. at 986 (citations omitted).
15. CHEESMAN, supra note 11, at 193.
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what has come to be known as the infancy doctrine, which provides
that the minor has the right to disaffirm a contract he or she may
have entered into with an adult during the period of his or her
minority.16 The infancy doctrine is based on an objective standard,
determined solely upon the age of the minor. That is, courts will not
inquire as to the subjective knowledge, experience, or sophistication
of the minor—except in circumstances involving so-called
“necessities” or “necessaries.” The only relevant criterion is the age
of the party entering into an agreement.
Under the infancy doctrine, the contract entered into by the
minor is not void; rather, it is voidable by the minor, who has the
option to choose whether to be bound by it. The adult party to the
relationship (in this case, ISTAR or the WPBL) is bound to the
contract. Interestingly, if both parties to a contract are minors, both
parties have the right to disaffirm the contract.
The minor may exercise his or her right to disaffirm the contract
orally, in writing, or through conduct at any time prior to the minor
attaining the age of majority (and an additional “reasonable time
period,” to be determined on a case-by-case basis).
Many of the practical examples relating to disaffirmance appear
in the context of contracts involving goods and not service or
employment contracts. However, in either case, if a contract is
executory—that is, neither party has performed (as, for example, had
Janine changed her mind before production on any of the films had
begun). If a contract is executory, the minor may be able to simply
disaffirm the contract. If, however, the parties have begun to perform
the contract or a segment of the contract (for example, a fourth film
is in production), or the contract has been fully performed at the time
the minor disaffirms the contract, what might be expected of either
party?
Under the majority rule, the minor is only obligated to return to
the adult the goods or property he or she has received in the
condition it is in at the time the minor disaffirmed the contract. This
rule, termed the minor’s “duty of restoration”, means that the minor
may literally return the consideration in whatever form it is in—even
16. See Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Minor Restrictions: Adolescence Across
Legal Disciplines, the Infancy Doctrine, and the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 343, 343–44 (2012) (comparing the contract infancy doctrine to
the treatment of minors in other areas of law).
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if the consideration has been consumed, lost, damaged, or has
depreciated in value.17 Under the modified New York rule, a minor
may disaffirm but is responsible for any loss or damage or
depreciation to the property or goods.18 There is a third rule that is
very unsupportive of a minor’s right to disaffirm. It states that a
minor may only disaffirm if he or she can return the consideration in
its exact original form—severely limiting the minor’s right to
disaffirm except in cases where the property has remained with the
adult (for example, a lay-away sale) or where the property has not
been used in any way.19 Thus, if a minor has received an advance
payment in contemplation of his or her performance in a future film,
the minor would be expected to return the money received for that
eventuality—the exact amount to be determined by the
circumstances—or perhaps whatever is remaining from the advance.
In a case where the minor has transferred consideration to the
adult party before disaffirming the contract, the adult party must
return the minor to the status quo—the position the minor was in
before he or she entered into the contract. This has been termed as
the adult (competent) party’s “duty of restitution”. Should the minor
have engaged in intentional, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct
that caused a loss to the value of the adult’s property—or in some
cases, where the minor has misrepresented his or her age20—courts
would apply a variant of the New York rule and require the minor to
essentially “hold harmless” the adult under these circumstances by
making appropriate compensation to the adult for the diminution in
value of the property.
If a minor does not disaffirm a contract either during the period
of minority or within a reasonable time after reaching the age of
majority, the contract is considered to have been ratified.21 The
contract is now valid; the minor is bound by it and there is no longer
any right of disaffirmance.22 A ratification relates back to the
17. Halbman v. Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562, 567 (Wis. 1980) (“[A] minor who disaffirms a
contract . . . may recover his [consideration] without liability for use, depreciation, damage or
other diminution in value.”).
18. RICHARD J. HUNTER, JR. ET AL., supra note 11, at 136.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Gill v. Parry, 194 P. 797, 798 (Wash. 1921).
21. See Bobby Floars Toyota, Inc. v. Smith, 269 S.E.2d 320, 322 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980)
(retaining the consideration ten months after attaining the age of majority).
22. See, e.g., In re The Score Board, Inc., 238 B.R. 585, 593 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding that
Kobe Bryant had, by his actions, ratified a contract with a sports memorabilia company that
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creation or inception of the contract and it may be accomplished by
express oral or written words or implied from the minor’s conduct—
usually where the minor remains silent after reaching the age of
majority.
Finally, all of the rules discussed above must be contextualized
by what is termed as the “necessaries” or “necessities” doctrine,
which makes a minor liable in quasi contract for the reasonable value
of items furnished for his or her “life, health, or safety.”23 What a
court deems necessary depends on the particular age of the minor, his
or her lifestyle or status (perhaps as a celebrity or child actor), and
whether or not he or she has been emancipated.24 Although some
courts have expanded the categories of necessaries, necessaries
generally include items such as food, clothing, shelter, medical costs,
and educational expenses.25
As noted, in the case of Janine—our child prodigy—it would
seem that under the common law, she could certainly disaffirm her
contract entered into with ISTAR at any time prior to reaching her
age of majority—most likely her eighteenth birthday. She might also
be accorded the same right if she had ended her relationship with
required him to make a number of personal appearances, sign a large number of autographs, and
license his image for various purposes, including trading cards).
23. See Gastonia Pers. Corp. v. Rogers, 172 S.E.2d 19 (N.C. 1970). There, Chief Justice
Bobbitt quoted the following (in the original language) with approval:
An early commentary on the common law, after the general statement that contracts
made by persons (infants) before attaining the age of twenty-one “may be avoided,”
sets forth “some exceptions out of this generality,” to wit: “An infant may bind
himselfe to pay for his necessary meat, drinke, apparell, necessary physicke, and such
other necessaries, and likewise for his good teaching or instruction, whereby he may
profit himselfe afterwards.”
Id. at 20 (quoting COKE ON LITTLETON 172 (13th ed. 1788)); see also Valencia v. White, 654
P.2d 287, 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Larry A. DeMatteo, Deconstructing the Myth of the
“Infancy Law Doctrine”: From Incapacity to Accountability, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 481, 489
(1994) (“This narrow definition usually included ‘board, room, clothing, medical needs and
education . . . .’” (quoting Valencia, 654 P.2d at 289)).
24. See Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc., 158 N.W.2d 288, 289–91 (Wis. 1968) (addressing
the question: “Should an emancipated minor . . . be legally responsible for his contracts?” in the
context of a circumstance where a minor has married; the court answered the question in the
negative, noting: “However, logic would not seem to dictate this result especially when today a
youthful marriage is oftentimes indicative of a lack of wisdom and maturity.”).
25. See Valencia, 654 P.2d at 289; see also Rodriguez v. Reading Hous. Auth., 8 F.3d 961,
964 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that “[w]hile the law on this subject varies from state to state, the
predominant rule is that a minor’s contracts are generally voidable but that contracts for what are
known as ‘necessaries’ are enforceable” (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14
(AM. LAW INST. 1981); 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.4 at 379,
§ 4.5 at 385 (1990); 5 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 9:5, 9:18 (4th ed.
1993))).
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ISTAR and then had entered into a contract with the WPBL prior to
reaching her age of majority as well.26 What she might be required to
return to either ISTAR or the WPBL is another matter!
III. CHANGES IN THE COMMON LAW
The common law has been altered significantly through changes
in the statutory framework in several states that have attempted to
balance the rights of entertainment companies or other organizations,
so-called “talent agencies,” who may expend considerable sums in
the recruitment, training and maintenance of their minor performers,
with protecting the legitimate rights of minors not to be taken
advantage of by “designing persons”—including, in many cases their
own parents or guardians. This balancing has significant implications
for the common law doctrine of disaffirmance.
Unique features in entertainment industry employment contracts
must be recognized. First, it should be understood that the
entertainment and film industries engage in a “significant investment
of both money and effort since the studios spend a great deal on
training and publicity.”27 Thom Hardin notes: “Presently, most film
industry contracts with minors are for short-term projects.
Nonetheless, a studio may invest substantial money in these projects
because it is relying on a minor to fulfill his or her contractual
obligations.” Hardin’s argument continues: “[i]f a minor disaffirms
his or her contract with a motion picture studio, the studio may lose
its competitive edge as well as its project investments.”28
A second rationale for modifying the standard right of
disaffirmance is found in the context of the recording industry, which
provides an “example of the financial risks that an entertainment

26. Bonnie E. Berry, Practice in a Minor Key, L.A. LAW., May 2002, at 29 (“According to
Family Code Section 6710, ‘A contract of a minor may be disaffirmed by the minor before
majority.’ Once an agreement is disaffirmed, a minor has no further obligations to perform under
it.”); see also Neimann v. Deverich, 221 P.2d 178, 182 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (“It is the policy of
the law to protect a minor against himself and his indiscretions and immaturity as well as against
the machinations of other people and to discourage adults from contracting with an infant. Any
loss occasioned by the disaffirmance of a minor’s contract might have been avoided by declining
to enter into the contract.”).
27. Erika D. Munro, Under Age, Under Contract, and Under Protected: An Overview of the
Administration and Regulation of Contracts with Minors in the Entertainment Industry in New
York and California, 20 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 553, 555 (1996).
28. Thom Hardin, The Regulation of Minors’ Entertainment Contracts: Effective California
Law or Hollywood Grandeur?, 19 J. JUV. L. 376, 378 (1998) (internal citations omitted).
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company takes when contracting with minors.”29 Erica Munro notes
that the unique nature of the music industry requires recording
companies to enter into multi-year contracts with minors.30 In fact,
“[t]o promote the popularity of child entertainers and their music,
these companies invest financial resources to further the careers of
their child superstars. If a recording company contracts with a minor
who later disaffirms the contract, that company may suffer a
financial loss that management cannot accept.”31
A. Providing for the Balance: From Jackie Coogan
to Gary Coleman
Any change in the common law must contain provisions that
deal with balancing both considerations: protecting the legitimate
financial interests of the industry and protecting the legitimate
interests of the minor.
Legislative endeavors to supplement the common law and
perfect this balance arose from a series of notorious cases involving
“child stars.” The most famous of the cases involved Jackie Coogan,
who, in 1938, was best known for his roles in Charlie Chaplin films.
Coogan was “discovered” by Chaplin in 1919 and soon was cast in
one of the most famous films of its time, The Kid. Later, Coogan
gained a whole new generation of fans as he played “Uncle Fester”
on television’s The Addams Family. After an impressive career in
silent films, Coogan, like many child actors, reached the age of
majority and only then realized that his parents had spent most of his
earnings, which totaled $4 million. Coogan took his parents to court,
but settled the case for a mere $35,000, because the money that a
child earned at that time belonged to his parents as a matter of law.
As stated in California Civil Code section 197, which was in effect at
that time, “[t]he father and mother of a legitimate unmarried minor
child are entitled to its custody, services and earnings.”32
Because of the publicity and public outcry for reform of the
system that followed Coogan’s suit, California became the first state
to pass legislation that would provide for some degree of protection
of a child’s earnings in the entertainment industry and of the
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Munro, supra note 27, at 555.
Hardin, supra note 28, at 378.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 197 (Deering’s 1935) (repealed 1994).

1182

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1171

legitimate business interests of the industry. This law, known broadly
as Coogan’s Law, was enacted in 1939.33 At that time, California law
provided some protection for the interests of the entertainment
industry. Civil Code section 35, enacted in 1872, restated the
common law rule discussed above that allowed the disaffirmance of
a contract by a minor.34 However, section 36 introduced a major
exception that prevented minors from disaffirming contracts when
they had entered into the contract in their own right and when their
earnings would be used for basic support of themselves and their
family.35 And in 1931, the legislature amended section 36 to include
the following:
A minor cannot disaffirm a contract otherwise valid to
perform or render services as actor, actress, or other
dramatic services where such contract has been approved by
the superior court of the county where such minor resides or
is employed. Such approval may be given on the petition of
either party to the contract after such reasonable notice to
the other party thereto as may be fixed by said court, with
opportunity to such other party to appear and be heard.36
Coogan’s Law added sections 36.1 and 36.2, which provided
greater protection for the earnings of child actors.37 Section 36.1
granted a court the power to require the formation of a trust fund or
savings plan in conjunction with the court’s approval of a contract
under section 36.38 Furthermore, section 36.2 gave the court
continuing jurisdiction over the child’s earnings; the court that had
approved the contract had the power to terminate or amend the plan,
as long as it provided reasonable notice to the parties involved.39
However, despite the protections offered to minors, children were
left with the fact that at least one-half of their money could still be
left under the discretion of his or her parents, depending on the
decision of the judge reviewing the contract.
In spite of the enactment of the original Coogan’s Law, children
continued to be disadvantaged because of the law’s perceived
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 35–36 (Deering’s 1931) (repealed 1993).
Id. § 35.
Id. § 36.
Id. § 36.
See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 36.1–36.2 (Deering’s Supp. 1939).
Id. § 36.1.
Id. § 36.2.
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inadequacies. Coogan’s Law was criticized on many fronts. Erica
Siegel outlined some of the most important criticisms in her 2000
law review article. These included a recognition that “[a]s this law
was written over sixty years ago, it failed to incorporate many
paramount changes in the entertainment industry that affected child
actors.”40 Siegel’s criticisms can be further summarized as follows:
[T]he studio system, under which movie producers made
many long-term contracts with young actors in order to
cultivate their promise for stardom, declined in popularity.
Children now commonly sign contracts to work in
television commercials or to appear in single film projects.
When children make contracts for individual projects, the
risk of disaffirmance decreases. Thus, the incentive for
employers or parents to have long-term contracts approved
by the courts disappeared and Coogan’s Law was never put
to use.41
Unfortunately, the Coogan case was not an isolated incident.
Shirley Temple Black, the popular and ubiquitous child star of the
1930s and ’40s, supported twelve people throughout her career.
Eventually, she only retained a few thousand dollars and a
dollhouse.42 Black would go on to have a career in diplomacy,
serving as United States Ambassador to Ghana and Czechoslovakia,
and later as Chief of Protocol for the government.43 Lee Aaker, the
star of the of the television show Rin Tin Tin in the 1950s, only had
$20,000 remaining when he left the industry. And Beverly Washburn
of the 1957 movie Old Yeller only had $250 when she became an
adult, after her mother squandered all of her earnings.44
These and other similar cases led to several changes to the
Coogan’s Law regime over the years, which may be summarized as
follows:
• In 1941, the California legislature amended section 36 once
again. The amendment granted the superior court the
40. Erica Siegel, When Parental Interference Goes Too Far: The Need for Adequate
Protection of Child Entertainment and Athletes, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 427, 434 (2000).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 438; see also Peter M. Christiano, Saving Shirley Temple: An Attempt to Secure
Financial Futures for Child Performers, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 201, 205 (2000).
43. See Shirley Temple Black Biography, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD BIOGRAPHY, http://
www.notablebiographies.com/Be-Br/Black-Shirley-Temple.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2014).
44. Siegel, supra note 40, at 438.
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authority to approve or disapprove a contract under which a
minor renders services as a “participant or player in
professional sports, including, but without being limited to,
professional boxers, professional wrestlers, and professional
jockeys.”45
• In 1947, the California legislature left intact section 2855 of
the California Labor Code, which limits the maximum term
of a minor’s employment relationship to a contract to seven
years.46
A more recent case involved Gary Coleman, the famous child
actor from the television show Diff’rent Strokes. To access his
income, his parents purposely worked around Coogan’s Law by
using their son’s earnings to create a pension fund for themselves.
“When Coleman’s parents appeared before the judge to enforce this
pension, they did not inform the judge that they were employees of
Coleman’s production company, and when they dissolved the
pension fund they received $770,000 while Coleman received only
$220,000.”47 In 1993, Coleman sued his parents and was awarded
$3,800,000. Unfortunately, Coleman passed away in 2010. The
Coleman saga directly led to amendments to California law in 1989
law.
B. The California Amendments
California once again amended its statutes in 1989. The
amendments were based on revisions made to previous laws enacted
in 1939, 1941, and 1947, with some important differences. The scope
of authority was expanded to include “an actor, actress, dancer,
musician, comedian, singer, or other performer or entertainer, or as a
writer, director, producer, production executive, choreographer,
composer, conductor, or designer.”48 The 1989 revisions preserved
the jurisdiction of the superior court to approve professional sports
contracts including, but not limited to, “services as a professional
boxer, professional wrestler, or professional jockey.”49

45. CAL. CIV. CODE § 36 (West 1992) (repealed 1993).
46. See Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Brodel, 192 P.2d 949, 954–55 (Cal. 1948) (discussing
the language of the 1947 amendments to Coogan’s Law).
47. Siegel, supra note 40, at 439.
48. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6750 (West 1994); see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 1989).
49. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6751(c) (West 1994).
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As part of the continuing balancing effort, the 1989 revisions
prohibited a minor from disaffirming an approved entertainment
contract during the period of his or her minority or at any time
thereafter.50 As in previous iterations, the maximum term of a
minor’s employment pursuant to a covered entertainment
employment contract remained at seven years. The Labor Code also
authorized the superior court to approve minors’ talent agency
contracts, reflecting the importance of such agents in the
entertainment industry. The Labor Code defined a talent agency
contract as a contract pursuant to which a talent agent agrees to
secure for the minor “engagements to render artistic or creative
services in motion pictures, television, the production of
phonographic records, the legitimate stage”—or other areas of the
entertainment field.51 Once again, if the superior court approved a
minor’s talent agency contract, the minor cannot disaffirm it. As in
entertainment contracts, the maximum term of a talent agency
contract is seven years.
It should be noted that the Labor Code did not mandate either
party to these contracts to petition the superior court for approval of a
contract; rather, it provided a party with an option to do so. Thom
Hardin notes that as a practical matter, it would be the entertainment
company and not the minor who would petition the superior court for
approval of the contract, not only because they would have the
“financial and legal resources” required to do so,52 but it might also
be posited that approval of a contract by the court would preclude the
minor’s disaffirmance of the contract.
Other important provisions dealt with issues relating to the
income of the minor. In order to protect the earnings of the minor
derived from an entertainment contract, section 6752 of the Family
Code authorizes the superior court to order, for the benefit of a
minor, the preservation of a portion of his or her net earnings,53 with
a maximum percentage of 50 percent.54 In addition, the court had the
50. Id. § 6751(a).
51. Hardin, supra note 28, at 382 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.37 (West 1989)).
52. Id. at 383. Hardin notes that The Walt Disney Company alone files 75 percent of the
petitions. Id. at 386. He also notes that “petitions that involve professional sports services are
virtually nonexistent.” Id. at 387. In the opinion of the author of this Article, this deficiency calls
for specific legislation that would deal with professional sports services. See id.
53. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6752(a) (West 1994).
54. Id.
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power to withhold the approval of the contract unless and until a
minor’s parents, parent, or guardian consented to its earnings
preservation order.55
The Family Code defined a minor’s net entertainment contract
earnings as the total sum received for contract services less required
taxes, “reasonable sums expended for the support, care, maintenance,
education, and training of [a] minor . . . fees and expenses paid in
connection with procuring the contract or maintaining the
employment of [a] minor,” and “attorney’s fees for services rendered
in connection with the contract and other business of [a] minor.”56
Hardin claims that the deduction for “reasonable sums” expended by
parents in support of their minors appeared to provide yet another
loophole to parents who wish to squander their children’s earnings.57
However, the Los Angeles County Superior Court construed the term
“reasonable sums” to include only those sums incurred to fulfill a
minor’s contract.58 Therefore, as noted by Gaglini, “meals and nights
on the town are not deemed as reasonable sums.”59
The legislation required a minor’s employer to place the
stipulated portion of the earnings that the Los Angeles County
Superior Court preserved into what is referred to as a “blocked
account.”60 The account was blocked (or segregated) to prevent
minors and other individuals from obtaining access to the preserved
earnings. A blocked account must be set up in a financial institution
that is located in the State of California and must be fully insured by
either the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) or SIPC
(Securities Investor Protection Corporation).61 After a minor reaches
the age of eighteen or becomes emancipated, he or she may apply for
the release of his or her earnings from the blocked account.62

55. Id. § 6752(b).
56. Id. § 6752(c)(2)–(4).
57. Hardin, supra note 28, at 384.
58. See Sally Gaglini, How Key States Handle Contracts for Minors, 13 ENT. L. & FIN. 1, 5
(1997).
59. Id.
60. L.A. SUPER. CT. R. 14.8(c) (Cal. 1998).
61. Gaglini, supra note 58, at 1, 5.
62. L.A. SUPER. CT. R. 14.8(d)(2) (Cal. 1998); see, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino & Monica Hof
Wallace, Recodifying Emancipation: A Précis of the 2009 Revision of Louisiana Emancipation
Law, 56 LOY. L. REV. 135, 135 (2010) (discussing the rights of an emancipated minor including
the right to administer property and the right to create conventional obligations—including
contracts).
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To assure that the minor’s assets were in fact preserved for the
benefit of the minor, the Los Angeles County Superior Court
required that “all orders issued for the setting up of a blocked
account . . . shall require the [minor’s employer], through its counsel,
set forth in a declaration under penalty of perjury that the [minor’s]
funds are being deposited into an account that has been blocked
pursuant to court order.”63 Further, the “declaration shall state that
the initial deposit made into the ordered blocked account was
accompanied by a copy of the order issued by the court and a cover
letter identifying the minor, the account number, the trustee, and that
the deposit and account are blocked pursuant to court order.”64
All of these requirements were established as a result of the
negative experiences of some of the most widely known and
recognized entertainers, many of which were described above.
C. Further Changes
On January 1, 2000, California once again amended Coogan’s
Law. The amended law now covers all contracts, not just those
approved by the courts.65 The revised law provides that the money
earned by the child is to be considered the sole property of the minor
child.66 The new legislation ensures that a child’s money will always
be set aside in a trust fund and that the trust cannot be touched by
anyone but the child.
IV. APPLYING AND EXTENDING PRINCIPLES TO
ATHLETIC CONTRACTS: A BLENDING OF THE
CALIFORNIA AND NEW YORK APPROACHES
Thom Hardin has noted that “petitions for contracts that involve
professional sports services are virtually nonexistent.”67 A second
practical problem is that no explanation was provided as to the type
of athletic contract or athlete the California statute covers; the three
examples cited were boxers, wrestlers, and jockeys—hardly the type
of athletes envisioned by many Americans as they would observe
63. L.A. SUPER. CT. R. 14.8(c) (Cal. 1998).
64. Id.
65. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6752(c)(1) (West 1999).
66. See id. § 771(b) (providing “the earnings and accumulations of an unemancipated minor
child related to a contract of a type described in section 6750 shall remain the legal property of a
minor child”).
67. Hardin, supra note 28, at 387.
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younger and younger athletes enter the ranks of professional
basketball, baseball, hockey, and soccer.
Erica Siegel offers an insight into a practical resolution of the
problem and the possible content of a model statute or policy that
might be uniformly applied to a wide variety of American sports and
to younger athletes who are making their way into the professional
ranks. Siegel notes that “Coogan’s Law and the corresponding
California legislation regarding contracts for child entertainers and
athletes served as a model for New York laws concerning the same
issues.”68 Section 35.03 of the New York Arts and Cultural Affairs
Law69 contains the following language:
A contract made by an infant or made by a parent or
guardian of an infant, or a contract proposed to be so made,
under which (a) the infant is to perform or render services
as an actor, actress, dancer, musician, vocalist or other
performing artist, or as a participant or player in
professional sports . . . 70
The statute provides that a contract can be approved by either the
supreme court (New York’s trial court) or the surrogate’s court in
order to provide the kind of balance reflected in the many iterations
of the California approach so as to assure an employer that a child
cannot disaffirm it. Note the language: “If the contract is so approved
the infant may not, either during his minority or upon reaching his
majority, disaffirm the contract on the ground of infancy or assert
that the parent or guardian lacked authority to make the contract.”71
In addition, the New York law grants the court the ability to set
aside and protect part of the child’s earnings. In contrast to Coogan’s
Law, where there was a 50 percent cap on the amount of earnings
that the judge could set aside, in New York, the judge exercising
jurisdiction over the contractual arrangement may set aside as much
of the child’s earnings as he or she deems appropriate. New York
law also differs from the earlier version of Coogan’s Law in that a
contract cannot be approved if it exceeds three years; however, “if
the court finds that such infant is represented by qualified counsel

68.
69.
70.
71.

Siegel, supra note 40, at 435.
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 35.03 (McKinney 1998).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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experienced with entertainment industry law and practices such
contract may be for a period of not more than seven years.”72
V. SOME SUGGESTIONS
One fact that might prove critical is that most professional sports
teams are part of a league that operates generally on the basis of a
standard player contract, or SPK.73 In addition, many contractual
provisions have been included as a result of collective bargaining
agreements74 arrived at through negotiations involving the league
office, its individual teams, and players (through their union
representatives, called player reps). Many of these provisions deal
explicitly with protecting the rights of players. An additional factor is
that players’ associations require persons who negotiate a contract
for any player to be registered with the players’ association and to
undergo a comprehensive training program as a precondition for
certification as a player’s agent.75 The uniformity of league-wide
contracting principles and representational requirements for agents
would bode well for similarly including standard provisions relating
to minors competing on professional athletic teams.76

72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. For a sample SPK, see Major League Baseball Uniform Players Contract, MLB TRADE
RUMORS, http://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2011/03/major-league-baseball-uniform-players
-contract.html (last visited July 31, 2014). See Simon Bernstein, Salary Caps in Professional
Sports: Closing the Kovalchuk Loophole in National Hockey League Player Contracts, 29
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 375, 377 n.13 (2011) (providing that the standard player contract
“means the standard form contract . . . which will be the sole form of employment contract used
for all Player signings . . .”).
74. An individual players’ association operates as the exclusive bargaining agent for all of its
members, pursuant to section nine of the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (Supp.
1935).
75. See Agent Regulations, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, https://www.nflplayers.com/about
-us/Rules--Regulations/Agent-Regulations (last visited July 30, 2014); Certified Player Agents,
NHL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.nhlpa.com/inside-nhlpa/certified-player-agents/ (last visited
July 30, 2014); MLBPA Regulations Governing Player Agents, MLB PLAYERS ASS’N,
http://mlb.com/pa/info/agent_regulations.jsp (last visited July 30, 2014); NBPA Certified Agent
Application, NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.nbpa.org/organizations/nbpa
-certified-agent-application; Player Agents, U.S. SOCCER FED’N, http://www.ussoccer.com/
about/federation-services/player-agents (last visited July 30, 2014).
76. Professors Yasser, McCurdy, Goplerud, and Weston list the following as services
provided by the typical sports agent: employment contract negotiation; legal counseling;
obtaining and negotiation of endorsement and other income opportunities; financial management
and planning advice; career planning counseling; marketing through public relations and other
means; and dispute resolution. RAY YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 515
(6th ed. 2006).

1190

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1171

Of course, a legislative consensus would have to be reached on
issues such as coverage, exceptions, time frame of validity of the
contract—perhaps by closely tracking the major provisions enacted
by the legislatures of both New York and California, as well as
considering the implications of the federal Sports Agent
Responsibility and Trust Act, which directly regulates agent
contract.77
It seems that in any scheme finally adopted, and no matter what
might be the individual sport, the minimal requirements should
involve: a requirement of approval of any contract entered into with
a minor by a competent court that would develop expertise on the
issues surrounding minors’ participation in professional sports; a set
aside of a significant portion of the earnings of an minor athlete in a
secure or blocked account; and a provision that balances the
extensive investment of professional teams in training and
development of younger athletes with limitations on a minor’s right
of disaffirmance if a contract has been pre-approved. It would also be
prudent to require that the minor be represented by an agent, at least
in contract negotiations, who has gained the approval of the
respective union and who has benefitted from a professional training
and educational program sponsored by the professional players
association in those sports where players are required to become
members of a player association.78
The same model might be employed when an athlete who is a
minor engages in competition as an individual in a non-team sport
but who is nonetheless required to enter into a contract in order to do
so. The minor might be required to select from a list of agents who
have received approval in the professional ranks or from a
77. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801–07 (2006) (regulating all aspects of student athlete and athlete
agent relationship). Player agents are permitted to negotiate player contracts because the player
associations have delegated a portion of the “exclusive representational authority” to the
registered agents. See Collins v. Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, 976 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1992);
White v. Nat’l Football League, 92 F. Supp. 2d 918 (D. Minn. 2000). In an arbitration decision,
Arbitrator George Nicolau stated: “When representing players, individuals certified by the NBPA
do so in the Union’s stead and as the NBPA’s ‘arm and extension.’ They thus act as the NBPA’s
agent.” Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n v. Stephen M. Woods, 592 Practising Law Inst. (PLI) 169
(2000) (Nicolau, Arb.).
78. It must be recognized that regulation of agents by players associations or by a business
entity or league absent a collective bargaining agreement may be subject to attack on antitrust
grounds because these parties would not necessarily be protected by the non-statutory labor
exemption. See H.A. Artists Assocs., Inc. v. Actors Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704 (1981); Collins v.
Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, 976 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1992).
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specialized group of contract advisors who have received appropriate
professional certification. The model found in the language of the
New York statute relating to representation by “qualified counsel
experienced with entertainment industry law and practices” would
be an excellent starting point.79 Principles regarding the set aside of
earnings should be required even if the minor athlete is not a part of
a team and has entered into an individual contract with a sports entity
or competition in such individual sports as golf, tennis, bowling, etc.

79. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 35.03 (McKinney 1998) (emphasis added). It might
also be prudent to consider the Uniform Athlete Agents Act, which, as Professor Yasser and his
coauthors explain, enumerates certain factors that might serve as grounds for refusal of an
applicant for certification as an agent:
[B]eing convicted of a crime that would be a crime involving moral turpitude or a
felony; made a materially false, misleading, deceptive, or fraudulent representation in
the application or as an athlete agent; engaged in conduct that would disqualify the
applicant from serving in a fiduciary capacity; engaged in conduct prohibited by the
Act; had a registration or licensure as an athlete agent suspended, revoked, or denied or
been refused renewal or registration or licensure as an athlete agent in any State;
engaged in conduct the consequences of which was that a sanction, suspension, or
declaration of ineligibility to participate in an interscholastic or intercollegiate athletic
event was imposed on a student-athlete or educational institution; or engaged in
conduct that significantly adversely reflects on the applicant’s credibility, honesty, or
integrity.
YASSER ET AL., supra note 76, at 525–26 (quoting UNIF. ATHLETIC AGENTS ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2000), www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/athlete_agents/uaaa_finalact_2000.pdf.).
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